Four Objections to Religious Liberty (and some Possible Answers)

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Introduction

Paulsen, The Priority of God: A Theory of Religious Liberty, 39 Pepperdine L. Rev. 1519 (2013)

I. "The Law Should Be the Same For Everyone"

(There Shouldn't <u>Be</u> Any Religious Exemptions)

- Strong Intuitive Appeal: "Equality" and "Fairness" (and Relativism)
- A Driving Force Behind Justice Scalia's Opinion in Employment Division v. Smith
- Is Religion Really "Like" Other Things?
- Overcoming Intuition with Constitutional *Text* (and a different intuition)

II. "Religion Isn't a Real Thing"

("Why Tolerate Religion?" Mere Nonsense; <u>Shouldn't Protect</u>)

- If honest, the true motivation (of many)
- The Inadequacy of "Liberal" Arguments for Religious Liberty
- The text is still the text (The "Embarrassing" Free Exercise Clause)
- The Rationality of Religious Faith

Paulsen, *Is Religious Freedom Irrational?* 112 Mich. L. Rev. 1043 (2014) (reviewing Brian Leiter, *Why Tolerate Religion?* (2013)).

III. "People Will Abuse It"

(Spurious Claims, Insincerity, Incentives)

- The reality of bogus claims, insincere assertions of religion, perverse incentives
- Trumped-up claims; exaggerated claims of harm or burden on religion (same problem)
- Slippery slope plus analogous secular claims?

The Draft Exemption Cases: Welsh, Seeger, Gillette

- Difficulty, almost impossibility, of sifting sincere from spurious (administrative burden)
- Another driver of Employment Division v. Smith
- Does the Objection Defeat the Rule? (Babies and bathwater)

IV. "Religious Liberty is Harmful to Others"

(The Problems of Ordinary and Extraordinary External Effects)

- What *kinds* of "harms" count? (And *how much* should they count?)
- The True Problem of Exceptional Harm
- Reconciling Text and Third-Party Injury

Conclusion